in economic life by turning the French populace into a nation of shareholders, a notion cherished by de Gaulle; and second, it sought to turn the underdeveloped Paris Bourse into the dynamic hub of French business. 5 Privatisation in France, broadly defined, is the process of releasing corporate organisations from public ownership either progressively, in stages, or in a single move.
It is, as political scientists Vickers and Wright observe, 'an umbrella term for many different policies loosely linked by the way in which they are taken to mean a strengthening of the market at the expense of the state'. 6 In France, this objective stood in stark contrast to the long-standing tradition of state intervention in the economy, stretching back to Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683), Secretary of State under Louis XIV. Colbert has lent his name to the enduring practice of dirigisme through discriminatory fiscal and public procurement policies, designed to promote public and private national champions while supporting nascent industries. 7 In the post-war period, 'Colbertism' has been practiced in various guises by political regimes of both right and left, including those of de Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard, Mitterrand, Chirac and, most recently, Sarkozy.
This article explores how the extensive social capital of the French business elite facilitated the smooth release of state assets into private ownership during intensive privatisation in France between 1986 and 1998. The term 'social capital' refers to the resources embodied in the structure of relationships between actors. 8 Sociologists
Anheier et al. define it as the 'sum of the actual and potential resources that can be mobilized through membership in social networks of actors and organizations', 9 confirming the observation of Adler and Kwon that 'the goodwill that others have towards us is a valuable resource'. 10 By analysing social capital formation and exploitation in its social context, we can find deeply embedded transactional structures that are self-replicating and a source of continuity amidst ostensibly extensive (but ultimately superficial) change. As Pamela Laird explains in Pull, revealing the existence of social capital and the mechanisms by which it works 'embeds individuals' stories into their social and cultural context'.
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Privatisation provides a privileged window on the workings of social capital among the late twentieth-century French business elite. With the large-scale sale of public assets through extensive privatisation, behaviour which would normally have remained hidden from view became, to a degree, more transparent, shedding light on the patterns of friendship and loyalty at the heart of French corporate business. While the rules of the economic game may have changed through privatisation, the structure and objective of the game itself remained unchanged. The logic of the French national business system, as reconstituted after the Second World War, and stemming from the concentration of power in the hands of elite economic actors (the ruling triumvirate of closely-knit politicians, state officials and business leaders), has been one of 'defend at home and attack abroad'. The pursuit of scale, scope and technological sophistication has been at the heart of both industrial policies and business strategies. The Chirac government of 1986-88 never intended that privatisation should expose French business to the chill winds of foreign competition, but rather that it should strengthen the ties which traditionally bind the French business elite, bolstering establishment solidarity in support of French business interests at home and overseas. 12 Far from widening participation in economic life, as Balladur asserted in his book, Je crois en l'homme plus qu'en l'Etat ('I believe in man more than in the state'), privatisation resulted in a considerable strengthening of the privileges of the establishment elite through the concentration of power in 'hard cores' of stable investors in newly privatised firms, often peopled by personal friends of Balladur. 13 The ties that bind the French business elite are institutional, strong and frequently endogenous, with networking among the elites being an institutional feature in France, systemically embedded, and supported by the state.
The argument builds upon and extends earlier studies of privatisation and the postwar evolution of the French national business system. 14 It draws upon contemporary writings and interviews with members of the elite involved in the privatisation movement. At the core of the research is a study of the lives, careers and networks of the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the 15 largest privatised companies (or, where appropriate, successor companies) in France in 1998 (see Table 1 ), exposing the links between them, the commonality of membership of boards and organisations, and the exercise of power through elite networks. The seamless transition from public to private ownership, from old to new rules, was accomplished by putting social capital to work in pursuit of common cause: the preservation and advancement of the ruling elite of business leaders, state officials and politicians under the new rules as under the old. The new rules ensured the continuation of the old game into the twenty-first century: plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.
[Insert 16 The importance of social capital calls into question the alleged meritocratic basis of elite member selection in France. As Laird insists, the mechanisms that facilitate or hinder access to 'the circles that control and distribute opportunity and information' matter most in determining who reaches the top in any given field. 17 In particular, Bourdieu suggests that social stratification and ranking are intrinsic to the modern French consciousness. 18 Despite ridding itself of a hated aristocracy, modern
France has, according to Sawyer, 'inherited patterns of social stratification that the Revolution and the Republic have never completely eliminated… The craftsman or villager as well as the count tended to identify himself, his skills, and his heirs with a given place in the social hierarchy'. 19 In the modern French context, the mechanisms that assist or impede access to elite business circles are primarily the elite institutions of higher education, prominent among which are the Ecole Polytechnique, the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences-Po), and the specialist engineering grandes écoles such as Ecole des Mines (see Table 2 ). Those from the 'right' background are more connectable than others, that is more likely to gain admission to elite circles, and equally to form connections within and between elite organisations. 24 The potency of the French education system as an elite 'structuring structure' is confirmed in Table 2 . 25 Seven of the heads of the 15 largest privatised companies in 1998 attended an elite Parisian lycée (including Janson-de-Sailly, Condorcet, Louis-le-Grand, Saint-Louis and Henri IV), while five attended an elite provincial lycée. consensus had begun to emerge among politicians, business leaders and the populace that, after years of expansion, the state had finally 'reached its limits'. 32 In 1986, just four years after extensive nationalisation, the incoming right-wing government introduced a far-reaching privatisation programme. As many as 66 firms, including 27 independent groups, with a combined workforce of 900,000 and an estimated overall value of FF300 billion (one quarter of the total capitalisation of the Bourse) were to be transferred to private ownership within five years. The immediate motivation for doing so was to undo what the left had done, but with Thatcherism and
Reaganomics sweeping the globe, there was an appetite among right-wing politicians to change the rules of the economic game for good. Consequently, the political and ideological aspirations invested in the privatisation programme by the government were considerable: the unfettering of the economy, which Balladur accused his socialist predecessors of having 'mummified' through nationalisation; 33 the freedom of privatised companies to manage, released from the constraints of government interference, which had reached a paroxysm in the early socialist years; the free play of market forces and competition, to which the programme purported to reconcile the public at large; the freedom of the individual to become part of the nation's prosperity through the purchase of a stake in some of its largest companies; and the freedom of the employees of privatised firms to purchase shares in the companies in which they worked, 10 per cent of each sale being reserved for the workforce. In short, as the state withdrew, it sought to devolve more responsibility to the individual in the name of making society as a whole more efficient and French business more competitive in European and global markets. 34 Ostensibly, the programme enjoyed considerable success, until it was summarily cut short by the stock market crash of October 1987, bringing the programme to a halt in spring 1988. By then the number of French shareholders had increased sixfold, from 1.2 million in 1986 to more than 7 million two years later, with a further 500,000 employees having purchased shares in their companies. There had been 11 flotations, all but one a huge success, including eight large groups and three off-market sales. Together they comprised one third of the government's programme, boosting stock market capitalisation by nearly FF100 billion. 35 The political pendulum swung repeatedly over the next decade, but privatisation remained a constant, despite differences in rhetoric and presentation. With the return to To carry out a programme which was labelled 'liberal' the government was wary of market forces. Nor did it have recourse to an independent commission to which to turn to make a decision after public hearings. All the major decisions that had to be made to implement the policy of privatisation were, on the contrary, left to ministerial discretion. And the minister intervened not only to define the new rules of the game but also to fix the price, choose the shareholders, and decide on the composition of the board. There never was so powerful a Minister of Finance in France: never did the rue de Rivoli matter so much in the business world. The
French privatisation programme did not represent any great break with the past.
Quite the contrary: it fully illustrated the State's interventionist tradition and even reinforced it. 40 In this way, the effect of the noyaux durs was to establish an interlocking network of French-controlled holdings in the privatised companies, thereby reinforcing the traditional structures at the heart of French capitalism, long parodied as 'capitalism without capital', and without sanction. 41 To create the groups of stable shareholders the government often relied on existing corporate networks; as the political scientist Joseph Szarka puts it, 'state-sponsored cross-shareholding set the relations between privatized firms in concrete'. 42 By January 1988 the noyaux durs comprised a total of 73 largely
French groups positioned around three key poles, Paribas, Saint-Gobain and CGE-Société Générale. Unsurprisingly, the chairmen of newly privatised companies welcomed the noyaux durs, seeking refuge in reciprocal shareholdings. 43 50 Nevertheless, while the unraveling of the noyaux durs may have reduced some of the financial linkages between privatised firms, it did not, as Table   3 reveals, reduce the networks of influence linking them in the search for mutual advantage.
[Insert Table 3]
The social networks of French CEOs are not only dense but extensive, reaching well beyond the boardrooms of major firms into other strongholds of the ruling elite.
Membership on the boards of not-for-profit, cultural, educational, sporting, and governmental organisations and commissions provides further opportunities to make connections, establish norms and positions, and more generally provide support and express solidarity. Table 4 [Insert Table 4 ]
Discussion and Conclusion
The mechanisms and concepts of social capital alert us to what was really going on within the French ruling elite during the privatisation era, encouraging the researcher to attempt to pin down the connections between key political and business actors. It is only through seeking evidence, painstakingly recording data such as schools and institutions of higher education attended, career types and boards elite members serve on, that otherwise hidden patterns begin to emerge. In this case, the patterns reveal, for example, that 12 out of the 15 CEOs of French privatised companies in 1998 had begun their career in public administration, several at the Treasury, from which they moved into the world of business in a process known as pantouflage, literally 'shuffling across' (see Table 2 ). It is for this reason that Szarka dubs privatisation 'the acme of pantouflage', since 'when public sector firms [were] privatized, top fonctionnaires [were] spared the burden of finding posts in the private sector'. 51 The evidence presented in Table 2 Citing Earl Graves, Pamela Laird asserts in Pull that: 'The ambitious… "never forget that business is personal" and that the person who "builds the strongest relationship wins"'. 58 The French privatisation programme amply demonstrates the relevance of this statement. Elite members who saw their command of the field of corporate power strengthened through their companies' participation in the noyaux durs of privatised firms often went on to enjoy significant spoils, likened to 'baronies' in the
French press. 59 These were facilitated above all by their ties of friendship and loyalty to key figures in the right-wing Gaullist administration, Balladur in particular. As Monjardet notes, the power to appoint to the board is considerable indeed: 'Control is, quite simply, the capacity to make or unmake a board of directors'. 60 This was a privilege of which Balladur availed himself abundantly during this time.
For some business leaders, the benefits that flowed from this took the form of a lengthy and lucrative career at the head of one of France's top companies, as exemplified by Beffa at Saint-Gobain. Some accumulated exceptional personal wealth, as illustrated by Philippe Jaffré, head of Elf-Aquitaine. In 1987, keen to boost the Paris Bourse, Balladur had introduced a favourable tax regime for stock options, enabling the senior executives of newly privatised companies to put in place schemes highly beneficial to themselves, entailing minimal risk. 61 A major public scandal broke when it emerged that Jaffré had received between €23 million and €38 million, largely in stock options, on leaving Elf when it was acquired by Total in 1999.
Clearly, the 'new rules' of the economic game were not all they seemed.
Ultimately, the rules driving who has access to power in and ownership of French privatised companies emerge as the oldest rules of all: the imperatives of social capital.
An on-going failure to move away from traditional social capital-based appointments, retaining personal relations as the dominant criterion, arguably suggests a failure to 'modernise'. This is ironic, since privatisation was justified as part of 'modernisation', to promote a more outward-looking, competitive 'liberal' economy designed to meet the challenges of the fast-approaching Single European Market.
The 'game' itself underwent various changes during the period under scrutiny.
There were changes in the name of the game, and the stated purposes for playing. There was a significant reduction in the number of empowered players, surrounded by a large number of pawns who might have thought they were in the game, as employee shareholders or small investors, but were not. In essence, however, the purpose of the game remained the same: the preservation of corporate and political power, and the trappings it brings, in the hands of a small French ruling elite jealously guarding its own privileges, manipulating circumstances and events to its collective advantage.
Networking is an institutional feature in France, systemically embedded and supported by the state through its systems of education, elite selection and recruitment, and political patronage. While obvious advantages accrue to individual business leaders rich in social capital who gain from the system, able to use their capital in a variety of ways to maintain their dominant position, French society as a whole must bear the costs.
The rigorous selection procedures of the elite grandes écoles mean that they produce too few graduates every year to meet the managerial needs of French businesses. Embittered students who see their career prospects wither when they fail to qualify for selection represent a significant waste of talent, while the French university system is overutilised, but undervalued, in comparison.
French society as a whole may also lose out in another respect. 64 In the close-knit structure of elite French business circles, unity of outlook and policy, fostering 'group think', may ultimately lead to a separation of the elite from the wider social body, as well as poor decision making. 
